Comments L Mo has made
Well put, David!
I would add that appeals to narrow self-interest have a role to play, but the proper role is as an additional incentive or as a guide to choosing between ethically acceptable options. So we might say, for example, "X is the right thing to do, and besides, doing X will save you money." Or we might say, "X and Y are morally acceptable options, but since X will save you money, you should do X."
Furthermore, arguing that we ought to just give-in to the dominate attitudes of the age, no matter how corrupt, will result in our own moral decay. By embracing narrow self-interest as the sole or primary justification for our behavior, we are teaching ourselves that these kinds of consideration are always primary. The result is that we start thinking about justice in purely economic terms, e.g., the reason we should oppose the war on drugs is because it is too expensive, or the reason we should oppose the death penalty is the it is too expensive, or the reason we should oppose the war in Iraq is because it is too expensive. The problem with this view, of course, is that if we could lower the cost, we would no longer have any reason to oppose these issues. (The issues I mention are merely examples; it makes no difference which issue is mentioned).
It is true that environmentalists by appealing to narrow self interest might be able to provide sufficient short term incentives to get people to do what is needed. I fear that the long term consequence could be that we destroy any viable concept of justice.
L MoOn Selfishness posted 3 years, 3 months ago 9 Responses
More on Desirable, Objectivity and Tolerance
John,
Others have already suggested to you that your view is full of value judgments. I agree with them. I think I have an argument to show that your language of consequences and desirability is value-laden in a much stronger way then you seem willing to admit. Furthermore, I suggest ethical and moral language is unavoidable. I also suggest that your insistence on "objectivity" is misplaced. Finally, tolerance is itself a moral value that need not, indeed cannot be justified on the basis of moral relativism. I apologize for the technical and perhaps pedantic nature of what follows.
'Desirable' is a word of ambiguous meaning when used in normal English discourse. 'Desirable' might be used to describe an object of desire, as in "Oh, Baby, you're so desirable." Or it might be used to describe the fact that some object is in fact desired, as in "SUVs are highly desirable in America." However, despite to colloquial usage, the logic of both these kinds of expressions suggests that "is desired" would convey the more literal meaning. When I tell to my wife that she is desirable, I'm telling her that she is in fact desired by me. When someone says that SUVs are desirable in America, they are stating a fact about what is in fact desired by Americans.
The most precise meaning of 'desirable' is `worthy of desire', `worth desiring', or `ought to be desired.'
Now, consider you're question: Are the consequences desirable? This question could be interpreted in any of the three ways I've suggested. But I seriously doubt that what you mean when you ask the question is: "What do you in fact desire?", or "What do you think other people in general desire?"
Instead, you're asking: "What ought to be desired? What is worth desiring? What is worth seeking? What is worth our effort to bring about?" I'm of course assuming that you think that there are better and worse answers to these questions. If this assumption is correct, that some consequences are in fact better than others, then only the latter interpretation of your question could be the correct one. The other interpretations cannot be correct because they are asking people what they desire, and people just desire what they desire and unless they are lying when they answer the question, they cannot (generally) be mistaken about what they desire. Hence, their answers are true, no matter what they say. But surely you think that some answers are better than others, or, as I wrote in a prior posting, you wouldn't be asking the question in the first place.
That was my first point. My second is that moral language is unavoidable. Even the economists (are you reading, Professor Scorse?) cannot avoid moral language. In a different thread, Professor Scorse argued that economists have been at the vanguard of a cultural movement to expand personal liberty. Almost without exception these economists are utilitarians of one sort or another. Their view is that liberty is a means to a more efficient market. So, it can appear as if they are not talking about morality; they're only talking about efficiency and consequences. But a brief review of the history of utilitarianism quickly reveal that this view of liberty and the market is seeped in a robust moral theory that claims that an action X is right if and only if from among the available options {X, Y,...Z}, X maximizes expected utility. This sounds like it has avoided talk of morality; but it hasn't. The strong moral claim rests in the term `utility.' What does `utility' mean? Well, it depends on who you ask, but any answer is going to make a substantive claim about what is and what is not of value - objective value. Indeed, the utilitarians, and thus modern economist, are perhaps more objectivist concerning morality than anyone. When an economist says that a consequence is desirable because that consequence will maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences, they are making a substantive moral claim. Of course, showing that one attempt to eliminate morality fails does not show that they all do. But, I think I have given at least a prima facie case that talk of efficiency and talk of desirability both fail to eliminate morality.
My next point has to do with the idea of objectivity, a view that is highly overrated. The idea that a claim must be proven to be objectively true in order for it to be accepted makes it impossible to accept almost anything. The philosophy of science is full of discussions of the problem of objectivity, about how preconceived ideas shape experiences, determine how instruments are built, etc., all of which influence the outcome and interpretation of observed data. Despite this fact, science marches on. Why? Because scientists themselves do not insist that something be proven objectively in order for it to be accepted. Instead, they accept those claims that are supported by the best argument, and what counts as the best argument is determined by the practitioners of science.
So too with morality. There are better and worse answers to certain kinds of moral questions. We may not know the "truth" about morality, but we certainly know that some things are wrong (e.g., just as we know that the world is not flat, we know that torturing babies just for the fun of it is wrong). We are the practitioners of morality. We decide which arguments are the better arguments according to the rules of logic and in accord with our common experience. Of course there are crazy people out there, like the people that deny evolution. The fact that there exist irrational people does not mean that science is an illusion or that science is useless or that science cannot make progress or that science is dangerous. People hold crazy moral beliefs. If they react violently to their views being challenged, then perhaps one ought to just walk away. My experience has been that on the vast majority of moral issues (except perhaps abortion) people are willing to discuss their moral views without getting violent or defensive. People are even willing to change their views on important moral issues when they are presented with the best arguments on both sides. The problem today is that many people believe that morality is exhausted by abortion, the death penalty and gay marriage and then take the discourse surrounding these issues to be indicative of all moral discourse. But such a conclusion is unwarranted.
One last point. Many people feel compelled to endorse a form of moral relativism in order to provide a foundation for toleration. Toleration and relativism are two distinct moral issues. I could be highly tolerant of other people's moral views and yet still have a very robust moral view concerning all sorts of things. What ultimately distinguishes the tolerant person from the intolerant person is what they regard as intolerable. The so-called tolerant person has a very small set of intolerable actions, such as, (ironically) intolerance, genocide, murder and rape. The so-called intolerant person has a huge set of intolerable actions usually populated by many actions that have no effect on people other than the person performing it and other consenting adults. There is a logical puzzle associated with relativism and tolerance. If relativism is true, what justification is there for tolerance?
L Mo
On Some inconvenient truths posted 3 years, 4 months ago 24 ResponsesResponsibility for consequences
John Fish Kurmann wrote:
"I'm interested in showing people the present and projected consequences of global warming and having a conversation based on the question 'Do we want to be responsible for this?'"
With all due respect, this question is not at all interesting unless the responsibility at issue is moral responsibility, by which I mean in this contect an outcome for which we can be praised or blamed. I cause things to happen in the world every moment. Asking this question only makes sense when applied to a very small subset of these events, namely the events that have some good or bad effect. Once we start talking about good and bad effects, were talking about morality, about right and wrong. Why should we care if we are "responsible" for something, unless we think that we OUGHT or OUGHT NOT do the thing in question.
The consequences of my stepping in a puddle after a storm is that it will cause ripple in the surface. I would be responsible for that ripple. Is that something I want to be responsible for? I'm not interest in the answer. The example is absurd and perhaps unfair, but it is designed to make the point that talk of "responsibility for consequences" only makes sense on the assumption that some consequences are good and some are bad and some are neither. So, why the objection to talking about morality?
L Mo
On Some inconvenient truths posted 3 years, 4 months ago 24 ResponsesMorality is here, and it's coming for you.
I could talk about these issues all day, but I'll try to be restrained.
Working backwards from Patrick's post:
We are the arbiters of what is right and wrong, and good and evil. We, humanity, are engaged in a debate concerning morality that has been going on for millennia. While it is true that the origins of this debate lie in various religious traditions, many of the most influential moral ideals are the product of the secular Enlightenment that emphasized the use of reason over faith. The concept of a moral right, to not be used and manipulated by others, not to be exploited for the benefit of others, to be treated as an end in oneself, not be subjected to risk of harm without one's consent, equality and egalitarianism, are all the products of secular, rational arguments that have been developed and refined, and ultimately accepted by (most of) us.
Mentioning emotivism was not merely a philosophical exercise. Ideas have real life effects. Emotivism, subjective ethical relativism (the view that statements like "Eating fish is wrong" express propositions that can be true or false, but the truth of the proposition is relative to the person who speaks it, as in "'Eating fish is wrong' is true for me, but may not be true for you"), cultural ethical relativism (the view that statements like "Eating fish is wrong" express propositions that can be true or false, but whether they are is relative to the culture to which the speaker belongs), and error theory (the view that moral statements can be universally true but that it just so happens that they are always false) all result in the unwelcome consequence that all discussions of moral issues becomes either impossible or a disguised form of manipulation. If discussing moral issues becomes impossible or is really a disguised form of manipulation, then our democracy is undermined; in fact, it becomes an illusion.
Whether Al Gore is acting immorally when driving an SUV depends on the alternatives that are open to him. If Driving an SUV is the only available way for him to have a bullet proof car with enough space for his security detail to be in close proximity, then his driving and SUV is probably acceptable. However, if I were to drive one just because I think it is cool, or I'm a slave to fashion, or I like the sense of power - i.e., for no morally legitimate reason, then I would be acting immorally if I drove one. The reason I am acting immorally is that I am contributing to the current and future suffering of others for no good reason. By way of analogy, consider torturing cats for the fun of it. This is immoral behavior. It does not follow from this claim that inflicting suffering on cats is always wrong. There might be legitimate reasons for doing so...like it needs an injection to prevent illness, or doing so will lead to important medical breakthroughs for cats or humans. But doing so for the fun of it is immoral. So too with driving SUVs.
I think is goes without saying that the energy consumption of the United States is at least morally questionable. Given the US contribution to the world economy, perhaps it could be justified in some way. On the other hand, given to amount of the US economy that is devoted to stupid bullsh*t, its very hard to imagine how my desire for a more powerful car engine so that I can drive more aggressively when I have road rage can justify the contribution of my V-8 SUV to global warming. Don't get me started about 5,000 square foot houses and suburban house developments.
Immoral America needs to realize that it (we) are being selfish, that we are jeopardizing the future of the planet for the sake of stupid immediate selfish conveniences and vanity. Vanity is a vice; selfishness is a vice; inconsiderateness is a vice, consumptiveness is a vice; stupidity is a vice. Almost everyone already recognizes these claims to be true. Describing behavior like driving an SUV is moral terms can make clear to people what they already believe - I ought not to be doing this selfish thing.
What needs to be done about immoral America? It needs to change its ways. We, who are concerned about the future of the planet, need to explain to rest of us that what we are doing is wrong. One way to do this is merely to explain the facts. This appears to be Patrick's strategy. However, this is only effective with those people who are merely mistaken about the facts. Most people know the facts. They know that CO2 is released by their SUV and that CO2 contribute to global warming. Yet they continue to drive their SUV. Tell them that they are being selfish, vane, inconsiderate, shortsighted, etc., and you offer them a different KIND of reason to change their behavior
I deny the claim that violence is likely to follow from honestly calling something immoral, unless the violence comes from the other side. The Civil Rights movement was largely non-violence from the side making the claims concerning immorality. We need not expect the Spanish Inquisition to follow. If it does, then we merely replace one immoral practice with another. All social movements must embody the virtues of courage to face opposition and integrity to resist internal corruption.
I cannot quite make sense of the claim that we can separate claiming that an action is a bad idea and assigning moral value to an action. All actions have a moral value. Actions can be forbidden, wrong, neutral, right, required, supererogatory, etc. Why, one might ask, is driving an SUV a bad idea. If your answer is merely factual, the facts might be interesting to me as I might be a science buff. But why should I care about those facts.
Moral reasons, like the ones mentioned above, suggest that the problem does not lie somewhere far away or in the distant future. It also doesn't make the problem a factual or technical problem. Moral reasons suggest that the problem is me or us.
So, I guess I've talked myself right into the position to which Patrick and others are so opposed.
L MoOn Talking point: Fossil fuel morality posted 3 years, 4 months ago 22 Responses
Morality 201
Patrick's view of morality deserves some comment. It appears to me that Patrick, in the hopes of remaining a tolerant person, is endorsing a view of morality known in philosophical circles as 'emotivism.' Roughly, emotivism is the view that when someone, like Patrick, says "Eating fish is wrong" what that statement really means is "Eating fish...Boo!!" In other words, to say "Eating fish is wrong" is just to express an emotion with respect to fish eating (hence the name of the view, "emotivism").
Patrick sounds like he believes that moral statements are just expressions of emotion, and therefore he wants to avoid them and instead be honest about his beliefs concerning fish eating.
As a general view, emotivism cannot be correct. No one really and honestly believes that the statement "murder is wrong" is merely an expression of the speaker's emotional response to thought of murder, akin to "Oh, murder?...Yuck!" Murder is wrong because it is a violation of the basic principles of justice, such as treating other human beings always as an end in themselves and never merely as a means - a principle that was one of Kant's favorites.
It is hard to see how Patrick's view could serve as a foundation for any form of activism, let alone public policy activism. If the view is that Patrick doesn't eat fish merely because it makes him feel bad, and his feelings are only relevant to him, he has no basis for reasoning with anyone else about eating fish. All he can do is try to manipulate other people in such a way that they will come to feel bad about eating fish, or do nothing.
Patrick does appeal to the consequences of eating fish, but on his emotivist view, those consequences aren't really bad or wrong. They merely make him feel bad, so for him they are relevant but they do not have any force as a reason for not eating fish for anyone else.
All I'm suggesting is that a view like Patrick's makes it impossible to have a rational discussion about moral issues - instead it opens the door to irrational manipulation, exactly the sort of thing Patrick finds objectionable when used by religious people.
Morality, in my opinion, is the collection of those values and principles that can be rationally established and defended without appeal to superstition or mere opinion. In particular cases it can be difficult to determine what morality demands, and sometimes people make mistakes. The explanation for our failures is that we are rationally limited creatures.
Finally, nothing about my view can be used to suggest that I am intolerant, or that I'm required to run around condemning others who eat fish. In the face of evil there are a host of possibly acceptable responses: ignore it, witness it, publicize it, denounce it, mitigate it, prevent it through discussion, prevent it through law, prevent it through force, etc.
To make the claim that burning fossil fuels is immoral does not commit someone to criminalizing it or even denouncing those who do it. It simply establishes (if its true) that certain sorts of reasons can no longer be used to defend it. This was Lincoln's point.
A parting example - I think that adultery is morally wrong. However, I do not think that adultery should be a crime, nor do I think that those who commit adultery should be denounced or ostracized. I would not turn away a friend merely for committing an act of adultery. However, if a friend ask me whether I thought he should commit adultery, I would tell him no, and my reason for giving that advice would not be because I thought adultery was unpleasant or distasteful, but because adultery is wrong - it is a violation of trust.
L MoOn Talking point: Fossil fuel morality posted 3 years, 4 months ago 22 Responses