Comments GliderGuider has made
Bali has finally crushed my spirit.
I was holding onto a slim thread of hope that the multi-factorial global crisis was finally immediate enough to overcome our psychological discount function and prompt some action. Alas, it appears that my suspicions about the ability of our evolved psychology to shield us from the empathic acceptance of any threat to those outside our familial/tribal boundaries were correct.
The mutually reinforcing social structures we have built up over the centuries to support the hierarchic and acquisitive aspects of our psychology - our economic, political, education and communication systems - appear to be in full self-reinforcing, self-preservation feedback mode.
As evidenced in Bali those forces are much, much stronger than most of us suspected. They are willing to see the the rest of us walk off a cliff, in the sure and certain knowledge that they and their familiars will be protected. In the face of the destruction of the planet's life they are fully prepared to sign our death warrants.
If this is what we can expect, there's no point wasting any more adrenaline baying at the moon. They have decided that we should die rather than live, and there is little we can do about it now. Like a rabbit in the jaws of a wolf, I have come to terms with my fate. I may kick feebly once or twice more - give another TEOTWAWKI talk, change one last light bulb for old time's sake - but really, what's the point?
We are finished.
On Countries strike climate deal in Bali posted 1 year, 11 months ago 20 ResponsesThe problem is a little bigger than this
As energy supplies begin to shrink over the next decade or so due to the depletion of oil and natural gas, national GDPs will decline around the globe. The impact will be especially severe in regions that are already under threat from Climate Chaos and population growth.
This will preclude the expenditure of the amounts required to deal with the wide variety of problems we'll be facing in a couple of decades: energy shortfalls, Climate Chaos and food shortages. While different regions of the world will face different mixes of problems as a result, it's safe to say that no region will be spared some form of extreme difficulty.
The reference to Naomi Klein's "Shock Doctrine" is especially apropos. The reactions of the corporatist powers-that-be to the prospect of this looming multi-dimensional global crisis was the first thing I thought of when I read the book. They'll be like kids in a candy store. To make matters worse, citizens around the world will be clamouring for a "strong hand" to guide them through the troubled seas. I am sure there will be no shortage of willing volunteers for the role of (ahem) benevolent dictator.
It's not at all clear to me that there is anything effective to be done except prepare for the most likely hardships within your own global region. Adaptation to the effects of this combinatorial crisis seems to be the approach with the highest probability of success. Basically, it's, "All hands to the lifeboats, women and children first."
For a close look at how energy depletion is going to affect national economies, read this analysis:
World Energy to 2050 and
Energy Intensity and GDP in 2050: To Have or Have Not
On It's too late to stop climate change, argues Ross Gelbspan -- so what do we do now? posted 1 year, 11 months ago 45 ResponsesOne other thing to keep in mind
I don't think anyone in this debate is using the word "collapse" in the sense of "falls over and stays down forever". The lesson of adaptive cycles is that this is precisely what doesn't happen. The system always reorganizes and starts to re-grow following the release phase. Whether you call what appears on the next loop "the same" system as was there the first time around depends on the degree of similarity, which will depend on both the nature of the resources available for the subsequent loop and the quasi-random formative influences that act on the re-growing system.
Civilizations have collapsed in the past, in the sense that they have undergone disruption, release and decline. Of course civilization has usually reappeared subsequently in the same geographic area with genetically similar people. Does that mean it's the same civilization as before? Or that the original civilization didn't collapse? I claim the answer to both those questions is "No."
Paul ChefurkaOn A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
I certainly expect some thing fairly dramatic.
As I said, I can't predict its exact shape, but I do expect us to enter the release phase of our adaptive loop with some degree of abruptness. When that happens I expect to see these general effects:
- Disruptions of significant human structures and institutions, possibly including the global economy.
- An unevenly distributed decline in human numbers that accelerates over time due to rising mortality.
I'm glad you disagree with my position, because we need people working this one from all points of the compass.On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
- Disruptions of significant human structures and institutions, possibly including the global economy.
"Best" collapse? Is there such a thing?
I have simply chosen to write about what I think is a high probability triggering mechanism for a general class of event I consider to have a non-zero probability. Given the chaotic nature of real life, it's virtually guaranteed that my scenario will not come to pass. Nor by the same logic will anyone else's - reality will inevitably be different from our predictions.
I talk about collapse because the Precautionary Principle hints that somebody should be talking about it. I think the possibility is being given short shrift in public discourse. Since the consequences could be so severe, the idea that some sort of larger-than-expected disruption to civilization (no matter what the mechanism) ought to at least be considered.
One difference between your reaction and mine is that you see fears of collapse as irrational, while I see them as being supported both by evidence and reasonable theories. You may see the inductive argument as weak, but as I said before, the Precautionary Principle urges that we pay at least some attention to it.On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
A Canticle for Liebowitz
Colin,
While my thinking leads me to somewhat different places than yours, we end up in violent agreement that there are urgent things that need to be done, and probably even in broad agreement on the kinds of things that need to be done. The main difference is that I expect these things to help mainly after the collapse rather than before it. If they do help before it so much the better, but I don't expect them to be able to forestall it.
The Irish monks you mention bring to mind the greatest piece of post-apocalyptic fiction ever written, "A Canticle for Liebowitz" by Walter Miller Jr. written in 1956. If you haven't read it, or if it's been a while since the last time you did, pick it up now. The resonances with our current situation will send shivers up your spine.
Reading it a year ago reminded me why I think that widely distributed knowledge retention projects might be so critically important in the years to come.
Paul ChefurkaOn A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
One quick correction
The 85% figure quoted is 85% of the theoretical maximum ethanol yield. In Robert Rapier's article that you quote, Iogen gives that theoretical maximum as 114 gallon per ton. 100 gallons per ton is 85% of that number, so Iogen's claimed yield of 70 gallons per ton is about 60% of that theoretical maximum, not the 6% (presumably 6% of the total input biomass) in your calculation.
My big fundamental problems with cellulosic biofuels are still topsoil depletion, water requirements and low net energy. My other objection is that the commercial immaturity of the process means it won't be ready by the time we will probably need it, which may be within 5 to 10 years.On Forthwith debunked posted 2 years, 4 months ago 13 Responses
You're welcome
I've posted a cleaned up version of my comments from this thread as a new article on my web site: Cracks in the Wall of Civilization - Who Has the Polyfilla?. I've included an edited version of your question and my response, because it's a very common concern when people start discussing population decline.
On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responsesharbor no "Final Solution" fantasies.
I am sometimes guilty of terminological inexactitudes and hyperbolic phrasing, though.
In that line above, a more precise rendering of my position would have been "the coming bottleneck will provide Mother Nature with the perfect opportunity to prune both our numbers and our structures."
In my writing I am trying like the devil to stay away from any prescriptive formulas, to deal only with what I think will happen as opposed to what I think should happen. We have no shortage of helpful proposals these days. You can't click a link without tripping over a list of suggestions for making the world a better place. On the other hand, we do have a dramatic shortage of people who are willing to paint a picture of what is likely to happen despite all our best efforts.
I've discovered that it's very difficult to say the things I do and not be misinterpreted. For instance as soon as one says something as innocuous as "IMO the carrying capacity of the Earth in the absence of oil is about one billion people," the accusations of genocidal intentions begin to fly. I assure you I am trying only to describe what I see as the most probable directions for humanity, while keeping my personal preferences out of it.
As an example of my personal preferences, though, I do give heavily to organizations like the Stephen Lewis Foundation. I take the position that while the dieoff I talk about may be inevitable, and I understand intellectually the position of those who wish to lighten the lifeboat by any means possible, I must be able to live with my conscience between now and then. An acquaintance of mine, for example, is implacably opposed to micro-credit because in his opinion anything that encourages the survival of the doomed reduces humanity's chances overall. I find his position utterly repugnant. If altruistic actions now were to save just a few thousand of the right people during the coming hard times, it could make a huge difference to humanity's long term prospects.
The point is, we really don't know what's going to happen, so we must continue doing what we are doing, especially the good, moral, ethical, uplifting bits. Planning the destruction of others (whether humans or any other species) is profoundly immoral. While I don't believe we have souls I do believe we have spirits (I use the word advisedly in a purely secular sense), and such actions are profoundly damaging to our spirit.On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
About gauging the odds
We also apply a hyperbolic discount function to risks. The more distant in time they are, the more steeply they are discounted. Immediate threats activate our limbic flight-or-fight responses while remote ones are analyzed quite dispassionately by the neocortex, with the result that they end up seeming much less threatening than they may in fact be. On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
The World Problematique?
What, you don't think "The World Problematique" is catchy enough? If it was good enough for The Club of Rome, it should be good enough for us. After all, look at all the traction they got with that term...
My position is that the Earth's sustainable carrying capacity after oil will be on the order of one billion people, with an overall average consumption similar to today - i.e. a Portuguese standard of living, a bit higher in some places, somewhat lower in others. I disagree with those who peg the carrying capacity at 2 to 3 billion because I think the ecosystem degradation caused by our prolonged overshoot has reduced it significantly.
I also take the Deep Ecology position that higher numbers than that would radically short-change the other species we live with and depend on, to the point that a long term sustainable living arrangement would not be possible.
I'm convinced we will be able to establish a sustainable civilization, but not with our current value system. High population levels make it much less likely that we might overcome our biologically supported urges for competition, consumption and reproduction. We'd have a much better chance if there are fewer of us. In addition, we would need to strip away the interlocking mass of social structures we have created that support and reinforce those urges. Fortunately (for some extremely small value of good fortune) the coming bottleneck will provide us with the perfect opportunity to prune both our numbers and our structures.On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
I don't think Hirsch had read THD
The concept of resilience or the lack of it doesn't figure into his analysis, which I feel is a fundamental weakness. As a result, though he correctly assesses the inputs to the crisis and the time-lines involved, I think he significantly underestimates the potential for disruption.
On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 ResponsesThe 3 Scenarios from the Hirsch Report
From Section VIII, part J, on page 59:
* Waiting until world oil production peaks before taking crash program action
leaves the world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more than two decades.- Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking helps considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade after the time that oil would have peaked.
- Initiating a mitigation crash program 20 years before peaking appears to offer the possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall for the forecast period.
- Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking helps considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade after the time that oil would have peaked.
* On the other hand, if peaking is imminent, failure to initiate mitigation
quickly will have significant economic and social costs to the U.S. and the world.and
* Late initiation of mitigation may result in severe consequences.
I base my expectations of trouble on the following foundations:
- We don't have 10 years left, the peak is here NOW.
- Hirsch works from the assumption of a crash program of mitigation being undertaken in advance of the peak. I see no evidence of a such a crash program.
I could be wrong. I doubt I am, though.
On A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
How does population change the picture?
It's very encouraging to envision a non-catastrophic decline to the beginning of another round of human civilization's adaptive cycle. It's also good to contemplate what sorts of changes we might make now to promote such an outcome. When we do this, however, we must remember to consider all the factors arrayed against us right now. Not the least of these is the burgeoning human population, or more accurately its burgeoning consumption and waste production.
There is no question that modern industrial civilization is the largest, most complex, most interconnected, most productive system yet seen on the planet. If the resilience theorists are correct, it is therefore axiomatically the least resilient.
Per capita energy consumption is a good proxy for overall consumption, and its change over time will, if anything, understate the level of overall consumption as the energy intensity of the global economy declines. Unfortunately, per capita primary energy consumption is again rising following its plateau during the 1980s and 1990s. When you combine that fact with a population growth rate of 75 million people per year, it's obvious that we are continuing to increase our pressure on the global ecosystem. That means that all the stresses THD mentions continue to climb, as does the risk that some perturbation may eventually prove too great for the system to absorb.
When people speculate what might cause such a perturbation, the usual suspects include nuclear wars, pandemics and climate change. I maintain that the likeliest suspect is none of these. Climate change is too slow and gradual, and while wars or pandemics could be candidates, there is one other factor that is both strong enough cause a problem, and absolutely inevitable. The clue is in the first phrase in the previous paragraph. The more I have learned about it, the more it seems obvious to me that the energy disruptions prouced by declining global oil production have a high probability of triggering a precipitous release of system organization in the near future.
"Oh no, not another peak oil doomer!" Well, actually yes.
We know that oil is a finite resource. We know that global oil production has been on a plateau for two years. We know that oil is intrinsic to the transportation networks that bind the web of ultra-efficient (and correspondingly low resilience) world industry and trade. We know that production is declining in almost three quarters of the world's oil producing nations. We know that production in some oil provinces and fields is declining at near double-digit percentage rates. We know that all but one of the 14 oil fields that have ever produced over one million barrels per day is in decline, and there is significant evidence that the last one - Ghawar - is now entering decline.
The Hirsch Report has made a convincing case that mitigation efforts need to begin ten to twenty years before the decline begins in order to avoid significant social and economic disruptions. Evidence is mounting that the beginning of the decline is now five years or less away. Not everyone agrees with this time line , of course, but several serious analyses of planned oil projects (known as bottom up analyses) have pointed to this possibility.
If the decline begins in 5 years, we will have by then added over a third of a billion people to the world's population. At our present energy consumption rate that hints at a rise of over 5% in demand just at a time when our crucial energy source is going into decline. And this situation will continue to worsen as the world's population continues to grow.
Now, if the effects of such resource depletion were uniform, we might not have to worry too much. After all, a demand growth of 1% per year could easily be dealt with through conservation measures. Unfortunately the growing disparities between rich and poor nations guarantee that the effects will not be uniform - some regions will face calamitous effects, while others will fare much better. Here is where the problem of resilience (or rather the lack of it) rears its ugly head. The highly interconnected nature of our civilization guarantee that local failures from system shocks like the sudden disruption of national oil supplies will have repercussions far beyond their origins, and in sectors of the civilization not obviously related to the original cause.
I claim that such failures are inevitable precisely because a rising population with rising material expectations will collide with a declining oil supply within such a short time frame that mitigation efforts will not have a chance to work. Population and time scale are the confounding factors for any foreseeable avoidance strategy. Combine that with the natural tendency of nations to try an ensure their own advantage and the reluctance of people to voluntarily impoverish themselves, and you have a sure-fire recipe for a stew of hard times.
And of course all this is playing out against the backdrop of the other stresses that THD mentions. Soil fertility depletion, fresh water depletion, the death of the oceans, deforestation, desertification, pervasive chemical pollution, accelerating rates of species extinctions, global economic instability and accelerating climate change merge to generate a rising drumbeat of ecological stress. We have set ourselves up for a Tragedy of the Commons of truly epic proportions.
While we may not be able to avoid the fate that appears to be looming over us, I maintain that there is in fact hope - though coming from an unexpected direction and not without cost. Here's what I see, excerpted from my article Population Decline - Red Herrings and Hope:
Start from these three realizations:
These three facts mean that although we are heading for a bottleneck, some portion of humanity will survive to regroup and rebuild in a massively damaged, resource-poor world. On our way through the bottleneck we will lose much of our physical and social capital. The one and only good thing about this, from a species, biosphere and planetary perspective, is that the existing socioeconomic structures will be forcibly and involuntarily stripped away, leaving room for new structures to take their place.
- The genetic imperatives that drive our reproduction, consumption and competition guarantees that we will not change our civilization's value set voluntarily or preemptively.
- Humanity is like yeast. We reproduce and consume until our ecological niche is stripped of resources and poisoned by waste, then we die off.
- Humanity is like cockroaches. We are resourceful, adaptive and hardy, and you can't kill us all.
The change in perspective involves not looking forward from our current situation into the decline. Rather, step forward a couple of hundred years and look back. what I believe you will see is the rebirth of the next cycle of civilization.
The question for me has become, "How do we ensure that the seeds are in place for a value set that will survive through and bloom after the bottleneck, a value set that will ensure that the next cycle of civilization has a chance at sustainability even in such a badly damaged, resource-poor world?" How will we ensure that our descendants will eventually inherit a sustainable world, even though our current situation is not sustainable by any stretch of the imagination?
I've become convinced over the last couple of months that the seeds for such a transformation have already been planted. They are even resilient enough to make it through the bottleneck, and they carry the correct values for the rebirth I suggest.
American activist Paul Hawken has just written a tremendously important book called "Blessed Unrest" in which he describes a set of one to two million local, independent, citizen-run environmental and social justice groups. These groups exist world-wide, and each is acting on local problems of its own choosing. There is no overarching ideology beyond "making the world a better place", there is no unifying organization, no white male vertebrate leader setting the agenda. As a result the movement is extremely resilient - no government action anywhere can shut it down, even though individual groups may be suppressed. These groups make up the largest (though unrecognized) social movement the world has ever seen. For a glimpse of some of these organizations, take a look at the web site WiserEarth.org.
Hawken sees this movement as part of humanity's immune system. While I like the metaphor and think it is exactly correct, I believe the importance of these groups is much greater than just their efforts to mitigate an unavoidable collapse. These groups have been called into existence by the world's dis-ease, and do two things: they work to fix local problems now (which will mitigate some local effects of the collapse), but more importantly they act as carriers for the values of cooperation, consensus, nurturing, recognition of interdependence, acceptance of limits, universal justice and the respect for other life. Those are precisely the values that a civilization will need to achieve stability and sustainability. To top it all off, many of these groups are led by women or espouse specifically matriarchal values, one attribute I see as essential for any sustainable civilization.
At the risk of sounding sentimental, I call these groups "the antibodies in Gaia's bloodstream".
I am convinced we will not save this civilization, and will lose a large fraction of humanity in the process. But I'm equally convinced that thanks to the seeds that have already been planted in these groups we have a shot at a much better one in a couple of hundred years. The crucial change in perspective required to see the hope in this is to stop looking from here forward into the decline, and instead look backward from a position out two hundred years and imagine what it will take to rebuild a truly sustainable civilization from the ashes of this one. The values required are already embodied in a resilient organization, enough of whose elements will survive to transmit a sustainable value set into the ecologically damaged, resource-depleted world we will bequeath to the future.
Good luck to us all,
Paul ChefurkaOn A review posted 2 years, 4 months ago 70 Responses
Thanks for the heads up on Duke
When I first saw this I was enthusiastic about it being early evidence of a corporate tipping point. While some of the signatories may be legitimate, it's all too easy for organizations like this to act as camouflage for those who find it easy to sign statements of principle they have little intention of honouring...On Big biz gets in line posted 2 years, 10 months ago 2 Responses
willa, your point is well taken.
It is indeed much easier to snipe than to come up with workable suggestions of one's own. As well, what finally gets implemented after several bruising encounters with reality will probably bear little resemblance to any of the original plans (that reminds me of the quote, "In war no plan survives its first contact with the enemy.")
The problem is that all these plans are the best I've seen, and they all have holes you could drive a Humvee through. Given the strength of the "enemy" we face in the Problematique, it's very easy to lose faith...On A review of Joe Romm's new book posted 2 years, 10 months ago 34 Responses
Lovins does have some good ideas.
I find his approach too technological (which limits its applicability to less-developed nations) and too optimistic in some areas like biofuels and the willingness of people to embrace wholesale change absent a demonstrated need. That said, he has a lot of interesting proposals (as do Monbiot, Romm, Heinberg and the others) that should be acted on.
I have one fundamental objection to all the solution proposals I've seen, and that is that they each treat only one symptom of a multi-factorial problematique, while ignoring both the interactions of different problem domains and the root cause of population. To give people an idea of the enormity of the "Global Problematique" I usually lay it out as follows.
The Problematique consists of the following problem areas:
Air, water and soil pollution. This is how we became aware of environmental problems. Acid rain, Silesia, Love Canal etc.
Climate Change. This is the one we've all been watching. Every time a new report comes out, it turns out that its getting worse faster than we thought.
Deforestation and desertification. The world is losing 130,000 sq km of forest every year. Over a billion people in 110 countries are now affected by desertification.
Depletion of ocean fish stocks. Big-fish stocks have fallen 90% since 1950. 90% of all fish species could collapse before 2050.
Depletion of soil fertility and fresh water reserves. Soil fertility on the Great Plains is half what it was a a hundred years ago. The Ogallala aquifer is being drained at 100 times the replacement rate.
Decline of the global grain supply. The world has eaten more grain than it has consumed in six of the last seven years. Global grain reserves have fallen from 130 days in 1986 to 57 days today.
Massive rates of extinction and biodiversity loss. Species are going extinct at 1000 times the expected natural rate.
Social, economic and geopolitical instability. The US national debt, cultural clashes, resource wars, terrorism...
Oil and natural gas depletion. We have burned up about half the world's recoverable oil, the supply rate is about to start declining, and the second half of the oil is going to be more expensive in both monetary and energy terms.
All of these problems intersect, amplify and interfere with each other. Mitigating one might be possible. Mitigating all of them is exponentially more difficult, and the case can be made that a full solution is not findable due to the complexity of the full problem set.
We live in a finite world. We have a global impact on every aspect of the ecosphere. We must continue to make what efforts we can to reduce those impacts, to make room for other species and to maximize the opportunities for our own. However, we must do this with our eyes open to the full extent of the challenge.
I take a lot of comfort from the recent work of a group of ecologists who are investigating complex system theory. They use the concepts of adaptive loops and resilience, borrowed from the study of forest ecologies, to describe how complex systems grow, decline, adapt and reconstitute into new growth cycles. I firmly believe that this better describes the progress of human societies better than the two-dimensional growth/overshoot/collapse usually put forward.
On the other hand, the idea that another civilization will eventually rise to replace your own is cold comfort if your own starts to disintegrate.On A review of Joe Romm's new book posted 2 years, 10 months ago 34 Responses
The disconnect
This disconnect between the problem set and the solution set is evident in every Global Warming or Peak Oil book I've read that takes the time to do a halfway rigorous assessment of the problem. Look at any of the works by Tim Flannery, George Monbiot, Ken Deffeyes, Richard Heinberg - if you want to see a tryly naive proposal, read Heinberg's new book "The Oil Depletion Protocol".
The difficulty is obviously the scale of the problems and the fact that any significant mitigation is going to require international cooperation in making ourselves voluntarily poorer. That will be a hard sell even as the effects of the problems become obvious.
Garret Hardin observed in "The Tragedy of the Commons" that not every problem has a technical solution. He was talking about population growth, but the observation applies equally to the GW/PO domains - especially inasmuch as these problems are merely manifestations of the actual underlying problem of too many people doing too much.
However, as you observe, it's considered unseemly to point this out. The human spirit must be thought triumphant in all matters, or it raises uncomfortable suspicions that we may in fact be merely part of nature, running by pretty much the same rules as reindeer or yeast. This notion is profoundly distressing to the well-conditioned dualist world view upon which our continued comfort depends. As a result, all the authors described above are forced to take refuge in puerile proposals, or risk not being published at all.
I personally don't think there is a technical solution to the problems of Global Warming or Peak Oil, at least in the sense of a solution that would somehow permit 6.5 billion people to keep on living this lifestyle in perpetuity. My readings on ecology convince me that in such an overshoot as we are currently in the pressure is ultimately resolved through a modification of both quality of life and population numbers. I see no reason to believe we are any more exempt than other species from this iron law of nature.
On A review of Joe Romm's new book posted 2 years, 10 months ago 34 Responses
Food scarcity
For six of the last seven years, the world has consumed more grain than it has grown. Global grain reserves are down from 130 days at their peak in 1986 to a mere 57 days today. Global per capita grain production has declined since then as well, down 10% from 1986 to today. While there are indeed distribution inequities, these raw facts imply that they are not the only effects at work.
It's interesting that in a post filled with positive references to a promising multi-faceted technology you choose to take the ad-hominem route of attacking my concerns rather than the substance of my post.
I'm satisfied that my concerns are grounded on an objective reading of the underlying science. While the conclusions may seem florid and objectionable to you, the fact that overshoots and population collapses are a common feature of all ecologies tells me that these concerns are eminently supportable.
Your dualist worldview and cornucopian fantasies cut no ice with me, I'm afraid.On A review of Joe Romm's new book posted 2 years, 10 months ago 34 Responses
Charcoal Fertilizer
I'm halfway through the book, and I've come to the conclusion that it's the very best general-interest GW book I've read so far. The tone is strong and uncompromising, but the book itself isn't depressing. What is depressing is watching the American administration stick its collective head in the sand (or somewhere more scatological, if you prefer).
My major concern is in the imminent convergence of Climate Change, Peak Oil and Food Scarcity. Researching those three aspects of the Global Problematique, keeping an eye out for ways they intersect and amplify each other, as well as how solutions to one may be incompatible with (or even prevent) solutions to the others - now that's depressing.
I'm thinking of putting together a two-book package on this convergence to give to people who Need To Know. It would consist of Hell and High Water and Richard Heinberg's The Party's Over - one of the better general books on Peak Oil.
Anyhow, on to charcoal fertilizer. I recently had my eyes opened to the general subject of Terra Preta do Indio in the Amazon. This led me to the discovery of the commercialization of the idea by a company called Eprida, and also to the academic work of Johannes Lehmann.
This research points the way to a very low-level technology that has mind-boggling promise: it sequesters carbon, it enhances soil fertility, and it can produce biofuels - both directly by growing fuel crops and indirectly during the charcoal-making process. As a result it addresses in one mechanism the three main converging crises: liquid fuels, CO2 emissions and imminent food scarcity.
It's also one of the few mitigation proposals that might actually scale up enough to do some good:
Actually, the scalability seems to be extremely good, as reported in this article:
Claims for biochar's capacity to capture carbon sound almost audacious. Johannes Lehmann, soil scientist and author of Amazonian Dark Earths: Origin, Properties, Management, believes that a strategy combining biochar with biofuels could ultimately offset 9.5 billion tons of carbon per year-an amount equal to the total current fossil fuel emissions!
As a result, I'm convinced that this technology deserves mention, an possibly even pride of place, in analyses such as Dr. Romm's. I have yet to see it mentioned in any general-interest overview of the topic, and I believe this is an egregious oversight. It's certainly as doable as a million wind turbines, less technologically problematic than CO2 sequestration in old gas fields, and much more politically acceptable than 700 nukes.
On A review of Joe Romm's new book posted 2 years, 10 months ago 34 Responses