joebhed’s Recent Comments

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  To maxx at 7:32

  
  maxx

  I am going to catch up, and then I think I will be computer-less for about a week.

  Yes, I did misunderstand that point.
  I hope that, regardless, what it came down to is that there is not, cannot be, any certainty about any of the policy proposals we are discussing.

  I believe you said that later.
  Something about, we "prioritize" different aspects of the policies.

  At one point you said that C&T proponents recognize this upfront, but that some carbon taxers like me claim that the tax can produce "known" levels of benefits.

  I think you would agree that this is not my position at all.
  To the contrary, my position is that neither of the scenarios, cap or tax, can have known levels of benefits either.  I wrote that earlier.

  You also opine that my RPS-like scenario does not apply to C&T because we have so many technology options here.

  I am not sure what they are, maxx, and I think our short to medium term options are inadequate.
  Once we get to 2020 or 2025 I think we will do fine.
  It is the interim that I worry about.

  I haven't seen the analysis that says we can accomplish the 80 percent in a "rational" manner without both nukes and CCS.
  And, to me, no CCS is tantamount to no renewables.
  Thus, the RPS parallel.
  The uncertainty again.

  And THAT uncertainty undermines your claim that the C&T gives you the certainty of the emissions reduction level.
  The only degree of certainty possible in the short term is a shut down minimally of some of the existing coal plants, threatening reliability of electric service.

  To me, C&T is a "build it and they will come" philosophy.
  If the C&T is going to include an auction and a flow of funds as I indicated earlier, and to Sean, then why introduce the uncertainty of the cost.
  We should strive to achieve our public policy goals on a least-cost basis.

  You say you prioritize getting 80 percent reductions by a certain time.
  I prioritize that also.
  But some economic principle out there tells me that the more it costs in year one and year two and three, the less capital there is going to be available, and the more costly it is going to be, in year 38.

  As far as having it both ways goes, I harken back to the CBO study, which I trust by now you understand looked at ALL the policy proposals in ALL the bills in the Congress.

  " The most efficient policy tool for decreasing CO2 emissions is the one that can best balance the costs and benefits of the reductions, even when both are uncertain."

  "The policy options described here differ in their potential to reduce emissions efficiently, to be implemented with relatively low administrative costs, and to create incentives for emission reductions that are consistent with incentives in other countries."

  "CBO draws the following conclusions:
  A tax on emissions would be the most efficient
  incentive-based option for reducing emissions and
  could be relatively easy to implement."

  Still.

  Thanks.On The goal of climate policy is not high GHG prices posted 1 year, 5 months ago 69 Responses

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  sean at 9;41

  Alright, Sean.
  I have not been ignoring you.
  I have been reading over your five-part manifesto.
  There is a lot I don't understand.

  Let's start with the simple stuff.
  You have mentioned that the C&T proposals to date are unacceptable.
  I agree.
  I am unsure what C&T proposal IS acceptable to you.
  Is that defined somewhere?
  If it is, I didn't see it.
  I don't understand some of the basis for the analysis.
  If you are following MY "carbon tax and incentive" proposals on this page, then you know that I am not talking the same carbon tax as you.
  I am talking about a carbon tax scenario WITH both sticks and carrots.
  My carbon tax proposal `mimics" the funds flow from the auction scenarios of several proposed C&T bills.

  I repeat - a flow of costs and benefits from consumers to consumers.
  The inflow of costs come from consumers to the government, through the carbon-producing industries.
  The outflow of benefits goes from the government to the consumers through the same mechanism as other proposals for funding technology research and development, capital investment and income-stabilization.
  THAT is how someone who is reducing a ton of carbon in a carbon tax regime gets access to revenues.

  Neither of us is backing any proposal already out there.
  Both of us recognize that we cannot get to what I think are our common goals without there being an investment pool available to fund the technology solutions that are needed.
  I think you and I are on equal footing.

  Having said that, maybe all I should do is ask why ANY proposal for C&T is superior to the carbon tax I am proposing?

  Is it an anti-government thing?
  I tried to address that.
  Is it fondness for the free marketplace, that invisible hand?
  Or, does it have something to do, again, with efficiency?

  In your example, the solar dude is selling his "carbon reduction credits"(CRCs) to the coal dude.
  What the coal dude has is an inadequate supply of carbon "allowances to pollute" (my term).

  Are carbon allowances to pollute the same thing as CRCs?
  If so, where did the solar guy get the credits?
  You posit that every(?) energy source will either have to buy something, or will sell something.
  There's a certain perceived balance here.
  I have no idea from where that balance comes.
  Is it just assumed?

  What if there are not enough of one of those somethings, like CRCs.
  Again, I am not sure where the "good guys" get their CRCs.
  In your scenario, this assumed balance lets the goods offset the evils.

  Let's say we're five years out, and FOR WHATEVER REASON, there are not enough new CRC-bearing entities without enough CRCs to sell.
  Not enough of those solar power plants got built.  
  What happens?

  This is akin to the RPS scenario to me.
  It's a "meet or pay" CAP.
  So, we pay.
  We still pollute.
  I just don't see how your scenario is any more efficient, any more certain, any more economical or any more viable than the carbon tax with incentives proposal I am putting forward.

  More later.
  On The goal of climate policy is not high GHG prices posted 1 year, 5 months ago 69 Responses

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  To maxx at 8:53

  You start by saying that there CAN be certainty in achieving the CAP goals, IF we start with an undefined, yet infallible, setting of the CAP.
  A business will "theoretically" know in 2012 what its costs will be thirty years later?
  Ummmmm.
  Excuse me?
  Wanna bet?
  Are you hiding everything behind "theoretically"?

  You've seen the bills out there.
  Are any of them acceptable to your definition of proper design?
  I hope not.

  You then posit that the proposed penalties ensure that power producers will not "choose" to fail to meet their obligations.
  Ever heard of RPS?
  They are doubling the cost of electricity in some areas.
  Renewable projects do not get built because of mandates.(CAPs and penalties).
  "Things" get in the way.
  Like unavailable technology.
  Like NIMBYs.
  Like regulatory uncertainty.
  The utilities don't "choose" to avoid renewables.
  But, there are none getting built.
  Again, the cost of the policy failure DOUBLES the price of power supply to consumers.
  This is what I want to avoid with the, yes, flexibility, of a carbon tax.

  Just like you say, there is no technology yet for a lot of things we're going to need.
  Every one of your negative observations about the carbon tax apply equally, if not more so, in spades, to a C&T solution.
  What happens to the value of the pollution permit when those technology, or material supply bottlenecks show up in five years?
  Do the free marketers give that old knife in your back a little twist, just to make sure you get the message?

  Unless carbon sequestration has a breakthrough this week, it will not be available before 2020 on power plants, even for retrofit.
  Without CCS, coal plants would either have to shut down or to pay 3X the price for the allowance.
  Which is what price, maxx?

  You state we don't have the correct formulas for modeling the answer to that question when it applies to the carbon tax.
  Again, in spades for the C&T.
  Nobody knows.
  It depends.
  Same with the carbon tax.

  You keep implying that without knowing RIGHT HERE AND NOW what the annual carbon tax rate will be, my position is fatally flawed somehow.
  But the C&Ters can let the market decide, and whatever it is, is fine.

  Well, I remember Enron.
  And I remember Bear Stearns.
  And I remember what I paid for gas last evening.
  Screw the market.
  Or the market screws you.On The goal of climate policy is not high GHG prices posted 1 year, 5 months ago 69 Responses

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  To david mack at 12:43am.

  Get some sleep!
  I can see that you have accepted Sean's OBS arguments.
  I am definitely not there yet.
  But I try to read each post open-mindedly.
  And I apologize if sometimes my comments seem off-key.

  There are a couple of threads to this thread.
  Distrust of government solutions.
  Certainty is the only acceptable option.
  The market is imperfectly infallible.
  At least compared to government.
  Today, those of us who want to posit public policy solutions for public policy problems have our hands full.

  Energy-wise, I am sure y'all have heard of the REA and BPA and the FPA, etc.
  I am a former electric co-op and municipal utility manager/ceo.
  I have seen, and done, what is collectively possible when good people work together to good ends.
  I have worked on behalf of consumers for a good part of my life trying to do exactly the things that Sean is doing, and wants to do in the carbon constrained future.
  So I am not afraid of advocating solutions that involve the PEOPLE of this country, acting through their government.

  You guys are rallying around something called "efficient incentives for clean energy".
  Well, so am I.
  As such, your criticism of the carbon tax as a "stick without a carrot" is meaningless to me.

  It IS a fact that nobody has floated a bill that includes the carbon tax and a package of socially responsible "efficient incentives for clean energy".
  But, I am.
  What are we going to do with the tax money?
  It seems obvious the answer is a revolving-loan/grant fund, a.k.a. incentives, for clean energy.
  Here is where thee seems to be a disconnect.
  Something about a tax cut?????
  I am not advocating a carbon tax with a stick but no carrots.
  THAT is the straw man here.  
  The mainstream bills out there right now utilize a revenue stream funded by an auction of carbon allowances, or what I call pollution permits.

  They, in turn, use that revenue stream to fund the triplicate of :
  Appropriate Income-restoration
  Massive research in Technology Solutions
  An Appropriate-technology Investment Bank.

  If anyone thinks these are not what is needed to make progress on a carbon-balancing energy technology, then say WHY.
  I think they are appropriate - and represent the manifestation of my "revolving loan/grant fund for clean energy.

  Only, I am funding it with the carbon tax that the PEOPLE are paying, and I am developing solutions for those same people, at the lowest cost. On The goal of climate policy is not high GHG prices posted 1 year, 5 months ago 69 Responses

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  to David Mack at 4:55 PM

  You seem to be asking ME for an answer to why the CBO did not compare the policy option of Sean's "output-based standard"(OBS) to the ones I describe below.

  Carbon Dioxide Tax
  Cap With Safety Valve and Either Banking or a Price Floor    
  Cap With Banking and Either a Circuit Breaker or Managed Borrowing  
  Inflexible Cap

  The CBO study was prepared in response to the request of the Chair of the Senate Committee  on Energy and Natural Resources, so I guess I can give him a call and ask for an expansion of the analysis.

  Below are the comments on the criteria used in the CBO evaluation:
  "In this study, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) compares these incentive-based approaches, focusing on three key criteria:
  A Efficiency in maintaining a balance between the uncertain benefits and costs of reducing CO2emissions,
  B Ease or difficulty of implementation, and
  C Possible interactions with other countries' policies for curbing CO2--that is, the potential to ensure that U.S. and foreign policies produce similar incentives to cut emissions inside and outside the United States.

  It can be seen that their approach is not certainty, but to maintain a balance between uncertain benefits and uncertain costs.

  Good enough for government work, and good enough for me.On The goal of climate policy is not high GHG prices posted 1 year, 5 months ago 69 Responses