The fierce urgency of now

Some thoughts on the merits of regulating greenhouse gases via the Clean Air Act 5

Marc Ambinder considers something environmentalists have been discussing for months now: the possibility that Obama will create a carbon trading system via the EPA, using the Clean Air Act instead of (or before) going through Congress to get legislation. An Obama aide strongly suggested Obama would go this route this earlier this year, but backed away a bit when conservatives spazzed.

(For more on how this would work, see an excellent piece from earlier this year by Michael Northrup and David Sassoon, and another from me.)

A few of the policy and political angles:

Advantage: speed

With a quality EPA staff and administrator, Obama could design and begin implementation of such a program within his first year, in advance of the UN climate talks in Copenhagen in Dec. 2009. That would strengthen his hand (and reputation) considerably in international negotiations.

This would fall within his honeymoon period of maximum flexibility, with large Dem majorities that could shrink in 2010 after two years of recession. It could be done in conjunction with massive stimulus spending to take the edge of any adverse macroeconomic impacts. In a stroke, Obama would become a historic president and make good on one of his central campaign pledges -- leaving him three years to tackle the others.

Advantage: builds on state efforts

Though the media has done little to tell it, the big story on climate for the past decade has been efforts by cities and states to take the lead on mitigation. As Terry Tamminen said in our interview, some 28 states are now involved in regional carbon trading programs, and more than 30 have put together climate mitigation plans. More than 900 mayors have signed the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement.

These are not just symbolic declarations; underneath is a great deal of painstaking work on monitoring, tracking, and inventorying emissions, developing sector-specific strategies and allocation mechanisms, and doing other ground-level brush clearing required to make systems like this function.

An act of Congress could wipe all this work away via "preemption" (though that's less probable with Waxman replacing Dingell, one of the great advocates of federal preemption, atop the House Energy Committee). The EPA, on the other hand, would ratify state efforts -- put a floor beneath them, not a ceiling above. It would establish a nationwide carbon cap, enumerate a set of regulated entities, create uniform rules for measurement and reporting of emissions, and leave most details beyond that to the states so that they can craft programs suited to their circumstances.

Advantage: rationalize the Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act is flawed. Congress has been loath to open it up for reform in the last few decades, as there are any number of bad actors chomping at the bit to screw it up, but even its fans acknowledge it has weaknesses.

Consider that the CAA mandates Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to reduce criteria pollutants. But reducing conventional air pollutants by attaching scrubbers also reduces power plant efficiency, which means more coal/gas must be burned for the same amount of power -- thus emitting more greenhouse gases. Again: The way the bill is currently structured, reducing conventional pollutants increases GHGs.

If CO2 comes under the CAA, the act would have to be reformed to rely on output standards instead of mandated technologies (goals rather than paths!), which would make for a much more rational and economically efficient regulatory scheme. (Much more on this from Sean here.)

Purported disadvantage: executive branch overreach

Conservatives go apeshit at the notion of regulating CO2 via the CAA, because it wouldn't give them a chance to water the system down in Congress. Oops, did I say that out loud? What I meant to say is, because it would give an executive branch bureaucracy control over the entire U.S. economy! Command-and-control crypto-socialism, people. It's real.

Keep in mind, though, that a Clean Air Act carbon program would largely cover what the CAA already regulates -- power plants, industrial facilities over a certain size, etc. The program already has mechanisms for tracking and reporting the amount of fuel emitters burn. It has enforcement mechanisms, though they've gone sclerotic under Bush.

Contra conservative hyperbole, using this existing bureaucratic machinery rather than creating an entirely new scheme would be the least complex way to tackle CO2 emissions and would involve the least expansion of government.

Purported disadvantage: transportation

What about transportation, though -- all those cars and trucks emitting GHGs willy-nilly? Will the EPA now take on regulating millions of tailpipes?

My inclination is to think the EPA will leave the vexed area of transportation emissions to the states. The CAA is not well-equipped to handle it via national carbon trading. But that's true of cap-and-trade systems generally; it's doubtful a legislative program would work much better.

The thing to do -- and this is my opinion, not sure how widely it's shared -- is handle transportation primarily via other mechanisms. You could slap a straight carbon tax on oil, raise the gas tax, repeal oil subsidies, or build out public transit. You could use more finely targeted tools like feebates, pay-as-you-drive auto insurance, congestion pricing, a junker credit, or California's tailpipe emission standards and low-carbon fuel standard. Different cities, states, and regions will develop different policy portfolios, supplementary to carbon trading, and that's for the best.

Possible disadvantage: allocations and offsets

One of the signal features of a good cap-and-trade system is that it auctions rather than gives away the bulk of pollution permits. This raises revenue the feds can spend supporting clean energy and protecting low-income people from the impact of higher energy prices. According to the OMB (and many others), the impact on energy prices will be the same whether permits are auctioned or allocated for free -- the difference is, the impact can be offset if auction revenue is spent wisely.

Another signal feature of a good C&T program is that it limits the use of carbon offsets. I don't want to get into the quasi-religious debate over offsets; suffice to say, at this stage large-scale offset markets like Europe's CDM cannot adequately guarantee that offsets represent real, verifiable carbon reductions.

If a cap-and-trade system were designed by legislators, it would offer federal answers to the allocation and offset questions -- not necessarily good answers, if Lieberman-Warner was any indication. A carbon trading system under the CAA would likely leave these questions to the states. Will the answers be any better?

There are mixed signs: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, which covers 10 Northeastern states) will auction almost all allowances. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI, which covers 11 states and provinces) will auction less than 25 percent. The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord (MGGA, which covers six states) is still hashing out its program.

As for offsets, RGGI allows around 3 percent compliance via offsets; WCI around 10 percent.

It would be messy -- something of a "patchwork," as industry is fond of protesting -- but one man's mess is another man's federalism. Laboratories of democracy and all that.

Purported disadvantage: reversibility

Couldn't President Palin undo the program with a stroke of a pen in 2012? If the executive giveth, the executive can taketh away.

This is actually an important point: one of the most significant aspects of a quickly established CAA carbon program is that it would create "facts on the ground." U.S. regional trading systems would hook up with other trading systems in in North America, Europe, and elsewhere. The carbon finance industry would grow large and form lobbying muscle. States in the U.S. will sign side treaties with states and regions in other countries (as they have already begun doing).

There will soon form a sprawling apparatus that the next president will be hard-pressed to disassemble.

Real disadvantage: public deliberation

One doesn't want to be sentimental, but there is something to the argument that shift of this significance should be discussed in public and shaped by the public's elected representatives. It would be nice, in an ideal world, if reasoned debate and discussion and interest-balancing yielded the perfect program.

But in this world, we're perilously late getting underway and Obama must weigh America's procedural ideals against what a wise man once called the "fierce urgency of now." Whatever it's other merits, the Clean Air Act is now.

David Roberts is staff writer for Grist. You can follow his Twitter feed at twitter.com/drgrist.

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  1. josullivan58 Posted 5:38 am
    04 Dec 2008

    I a backer of using the CAAto regulate GHG. The CAA with all its faults has been very successful and cost effective. The National Academies of Sciences did a review of the CAA and came to this conclusion.
    The 'executive branch overreach' is a only purported disadvantage. Its a hand-wavey way for conservatives to say they don't like business regulations. It gets used by the right almost reflexively.
    Reversibility isn't a big problem for enviros. The executive branch still must follow the law, and once a GHG program is in place it will be a violation of the CAA to reverse it.
    If there was ever an example of not letting the perfect get in the way of the good, its using the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases.  
    The lack of public deliberation is a problem. Something this big ideally would be debated. The public comment period during rule making will however allow lots of input from concerned citizens.
  2. retroproxy Posted 7:42 am
    04 Dec 2008

    I Love CO2The radiative forcing of CO2 is miniscule. CO2 is not a pollutant; it's not dirty. CO2 is an essential trace gas necessary for life. Increasing CO2 levels benefits the biosphere, but has virtually no effect on climate. It's a fact that concentrations of CO2 have increased by about 0.008 percent in ~30 years, and they now comprise about 0.038 percent of all greenhouse gases. How can any logical person continue to believe the radiative forcing from a gas that comprises one-third of one percent of all GHGs will override natural climate cycles and catastrophically warm the Earth? We've had no warming in 10 years, and global mean temperatures have fallen steadily since 2002. Climate has always changed, and will always change, and a little extra CO2 will do nothing. Here's the data showing global cooling as CO2 emissions rise: http://icecap.us/images/uploads/MSUCRUCO2.jpg
  3. jha Posted 12:34 pm
    04 Dec 2008

    Not Such a Good PathDavid --
    I think you dramatically overstate the benefits of trying to do a cap-and-trade system under the CAA without legislation.
    As a preamble, let me make clear that I believe the EPA is obligated to regulate GHGs under the Act, and not just from motor vehicles.  It will have to regulate from stationary sources as well.
    As for your arguments, first, I believe it is highly unlikely that an administrative effort to create cap-and-trade under the existing Act would be quicker than legislative change.  The reason is that any regulations that are this ambitious would be tied upon in Court and not implemented for years.  Even if eventually upheld in the courts, the rules would not be enforced for years.  See, e.g., the Clinton NAAQS revisions (or, for what happens when the regs fail, the Bush Administration CAIR rule).
    Second, I think you are mistaken to write that "a Clean Air Act carbon program would largely cover what the CAA already regulates."  Under current law, GHG regulation will require the EPA to regulate many thousands of facilities and buildings that are not currently covered by the Act, in part because so many facilities emit so much more CO2 than other regulated emissions (so they aren't major sources for other emissions, but would be for CO2).  So, for example, applying the Act to GHGs would, in a single stroke, increase the number of facilities covered by the PSD program tenfold (if not more). The effect of applying other provisions to GHGs could be equally expansive, particularly if (as I believe) the EPA is obligated to try and set a NAAQS, and require SIPs for GHGs.
    Third, I am not sure a regulatory system can do all that much to build on state efforts, particularly the regional trading efforts, as the various regional trading regimes are unenforceable until they are ratified by Congress under the Compacts clause.
    I could go on.
    The bottom line is that if you want cap-and-trade (or other significant reforms), then you should want legislation. The existing Act can impose lots of regulatory restrictions, but won't allow for particularly rational or efficient climate policy.
    Food for thought.
    Jonathan H. Adler

  4. GreenMom Posted 1:06 am
    05 Dec 2008

    It's not an either-orDavid, I think you have captured the landscape really well.
    Jonathan, I agree with everything you say (I was going to make the same point about the rules inevitably getting tied up in court).
    BUT I think you did not mention an important benefit of undertaking the adminitrative effort at EPA.  Inevitably, a serious EPA effort toward promulgating carbon rules will light more of a fire under Congress' butt to pre-empt EPA with legislation.  
    That could be all to the good (hopefully), as legislation is much less likely to result in a protracted court battle.
    I recognize the pitfalls you guys have pointed out -- that Congress could override tighter state efforts, for example...but I'm pinning my hopes on President Obama and Chairman Waxman [let me savor that for a moment... President Obama. Chairman (of the full committee) Waxman...].

  5. Sean Casten's avatar

    Sean Casten Posted 4:41 am
    08 Dec 2008

    You know I agreebut will chime in with a few points, in response to the comments above.
    Mark Ambinder: the decision to regulate CO2 under the CAA is not the same as a decision to regulate CO2 in a cap & trade structure under the CAA.  C&T, for it's merits is hugely complicated and has the potential for legislative & legal challenge.  The CAA alone has the benefit of precedent but for the fact that the current input-based regulatory model would immediately put CO2 compliance in conflict with criteria pollutant compliance.  But that's no less true if Congress regulates CO2, so the CAA has to be fixed regardless.  In that vein, it seems to me that it is vastly easier to fix with minimal unintended consequences if CO2 is inside the CAA and all redrafting of one section can be accompanied by concurrent redrafting in another, without having to first shuffle back to Capitol Hill to square conflicts.
    Re: transport, as I've said many times, it is hard from a regulatory perspective for a CO2 bill to cover the transport sector for obvious compliance-tracking reasons.  But with the ownership costs of a car dominated by the cost of a car rather than the cost of the fuel, it's highly unlikely that any kind of carbon pricing would meaningfully affect transportation sector emissions anyway.  (This is especially so if the clearing price for CO2 is set in other markets that have higher variable cost structures.)  This may or may not suggest that we shouldn't try, but - at least to my mind - suggests that an effective transportation-sector model must include vehicle-level regulations in addition to (or in lieu of) regulations based on CO2 release.  There is a pretty good federal model for this, both through CAFE and (in other sectors) through appliance standards.  
    I don't claim sufficient expertise in the transport sector to say exactly what the optimal way to structure that sector is, but I do think that it is likely to be sufficiently different from other sectors that an effective CO2 regulation must treat that sector differently - which in turn means that the political and structural challenges associated with transport shouldn't impact our decisions to do something for the other sectors, since we'll have to do something different there anyway.
    One final point: the other pushback to federal oversight is likely, paradoxically, to come from the states.  RGGI, for better or for worse, is providing $ to states to top up constrained state budgets.  Whether CO2 is regulated by EPA or by Congress, a consequence of the delay in federal leadership on CO2 is that any effort now raises the potential for a fiscal fight and/or horsetrade between the feds and the states.

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