This is a guest essay from Amory B. Lovins and Imran Sheikh of the Rocky Mountain Institute.
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David Bradish, in a post on the blog of the Nuclear Energy Institute, criticizes our methodology used to derive micropower's output in "The Nuclear Illusion" (PDF). As Mr. Bradish notes in hypertext, our methodology is online here (PDF), and our micropower database is posted and documented here. Here's our point-by-point response to his critique:
"With the exception of nuclear, the data for the chart aren't actual generation numbers. RMI collected the capacity and capacity factor data for the other sources to calculate the generation."
For many generation types, only capacity and capacity factor data are available. That's partly because the data often come from surveys of production or installation, typically based on unit-by-unit data from vendors or their trade associations. Data on measured output are rarer because they're normally collected by national energy authorities that often don't count small and non-utility units or don't consistently record the type of unit. Then those output data are added up, with many gaps, to estimate global totals.
We used all the reliable capacity data we could find using bottom-up industry data covering most main countries, though with notable gaps we described. Then we calculated output using capacity factors that Mr. Bradish agrees are reasonable (other than cogen -- see below). Finally, where possible, we compared calculated output to estimated output from other sources to verify that our calculations were realistic. If more generation data were available, we'd be glad to learn about them so we can apply them to our analysis. But so far, measured global generation data are available only for nuclear, though some specific jurisdictions do track other sources too.
"The problem with the 83 percent [Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation] capacity factor is it is twice as high as what it should be."
The data we used from Michael Brown at WADE (which compiled the leading global cogeneration database on which we relied) suggested that Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation capacity actually runs (not just is available to run -- an ambiguity Mr. Bradish wrongly introduces) about 7,250 hours per year, or 83 percent of the time. (Mr. Brown's estimate was actually a range -- ~7,000-7,500 h/y, "possibly more," and we chose the mean). WADE's economic analysis of cogen on p. 5 of the cited World Survey of Decentralized Energy 2005 uses 7,500 h/y, equivalent to 85.6 percent.
Mr. Bradish's incorrect claim that our 83 percent cogen capacity factor is two-fold too high results from combining three errors:
- Average capacity factor of all decentralized plant types cannot be validly applied to cogeneration or any other type in the mix: Mr. Bradish calculates the average capacity factor of several kinds of decentralized electricity sources (for a subset of countries, see next point) and applies it to cogen. However, decentralized electricity comes from many sources (wind, PV, solar-thermal-electric, geothermal, biomass/wastes, small hydro, other renewables, cogen) with widely varying capacities and capacity factors. Some decentralized generators, like wind and PVs, have much lower capacity factors (nominally 25 percent and 17 percent respectively) than the overall average (66 percent), while other components like biomass, geothermal, and decentralized cogen have higher capacity factors than the average (70 percent, 75 percent, and 83 percent respectively). Clearly it's wrong to apply the average of all sources to a single type -- whether cogen or, say, photovoltaics, which under Mr. Bradish's logic would also have a capacity factor of 40.1 percent.
His claims that "it is impossible" for cogen to have an 83 percent capacity factor, since it makes up "the majority of the decentralized capacity," overlooks that our micropower data include many types of renewables that WADE excludes. For example, windpower, with >100 GW installed worldwide, is the largest single component of renewables-other-than-big-hydro, but WADE excludes 95 percent of windpower and assigns an 18 percent capacity factor to the 5 percent (small onsite unit) that it counts. We count 100 percent at 25 percent average capacity factor.
Our methodology derives our stated average capacity factor from the empirical capacity factors for each source. Our nominal 83 percent cogen capacity factor is entirely consistent with the ~80-90+ percent often observed in the process industries that adopt cogen, combined with the lower but still substantial capacity factors of district heating systems in the cold climates where they're used. An average 40 percent capacity factor for total cogeneration would be very low, and would often make the investment unattractive.
- Small sample of countries may not represent the whole: The WADE 2005 Survey includes generation and capacity factor data for 14 countries. Bradish assumes that the overall capacity factor for these 14 countries (40.1 percent) will apply to the whole world. But the mix and operating conditions of decentralized plants in these countries may not be representative of the global mix.
Decentralized generation provided 971.5 TWh (2003-04 data) in the 14 countries WADE profiled for 2005, but that excludes the rest of the world, 95 percent of windpower, and 100 percent of other renewables except photovoltaics. RMI's definition of micropower includes all renewables except big hydro (<10 MW), so RMI's worldwide estimate of 2,473 TWh (2004) for all decentralized generation seems reasonable under these circumstances. RMI's estimates for distributed renewables are also very close to the independent bottom-up compilation at ren21.net; that authoritative source's estimates are slightly higher than ours because it uses a higher size cutoff for small hydro.
- Potential confusion over peaking and standby plants: It's unclear in the WADE report whether national profiles include standby and peaking plants as part of decentralized capacity. RMI's analysis explicitly breaks out standby and peaking plants according to WADE's global estimates, and excludes those plants from our capacity and output totals unless otherwise specified. Mr. Bradish's estimate that cogeneration/decentralized fueled generation has a 40.1 percent capacity factor is probably distorted by including a large amount of standby and peaking capacity that rarely runs: WADE's 2006 survey, on p. 34, shows nominal capacity factors of 72.5 percent for continuously operating engine and gas-turbine units, 12.5 percent for peakers, and 2.5 percent for standby units.
Together, these three errors account for Mr. Bradish's two-fold underestimate of cogen capacity factor.
"There is [no] ... methodology" for RMI's projections of micropower growth during 2008-2010.
Our methodology is clearly described. For cogeneration, which seems to be the part Mr. Bradish takes exception to, we started with the 2005 projections for 2012 by WADE, the World Alliance for Decentralized Energy -- the global umbrella trade organization for distributed generation. We conservatively decreased WADE's growth target from 14 percent to 12 percent, consistent with WADE's director's recommendation, to take account of current market developments (such as gas prices). However, our graphed projection to 2010 is not, as Mr. Bradish implies, relevant to our demonstration that micropower already surpassed nuclear's global output in 2006 and its capacity in 2002.
"RMI's graph is all 'chartjunk.' The graph displays a lot of ink for the 'Total renewables plus decentralized generation' data that deceives the eye."
Mr. Bradish argues that our Figures 6 and 7 ("The Nuclear Illusion" p. 30) deceive the reader by giving more weight to micropower than to nuclear. He offers a modified figure in which each type of micropower is represented as a separate unstacked line:
This misses the point of our graph: that the diversified portfolio of micropower technologies exceeds nuclear's capacity and output in total, though not in each component, and is growing far faster in aggregate. Mr. Bradish unstacks the graph to fragment micropower, obscure its total effect, and thus make nuclear look good. Since it's hard for readers to do the mental addition of many separate types of micropower and translate their sum into a mental picture, we stacked our graph, so readers could see how many small units of many types add up to more capacity and generate more electricity than nuclear. That's not incorrect; it's just awkward. Mr. Bradish should deal with this reality, not claim it's somehow an artifact of an incorrect graphical representation.
We are familiar with Prof. Tufte's excellent books on honest and effective graphics, and we take his lessons seriously. One of them is to design the graph to tell the story intended. Our story is that nuclear has been surpassed and far outpaced by a swarm of diverse micropower technologies, even though it's bigger than any of them individually. So long as the nuclear industry fails to grasp this, it will continue to misunderstand what its most potent competitors are. Gulliver was bigger than the individual Lilliputians, too, but together they laid him low.
Prof. Tufte coined the pejorative term "chartjunk" to refer to ink that conveys no news. Mr. Bradish misapplies it to a clean and clear graph conveying news he finds unwelcome. That's blogjunk.
"Cherry-Picking the Data"
Mr. Bradish's accusation that RMI selected anomalous data to support our argument overlooks several key points besides his mistaken redrawing of our graphs. He objects that WADE's 2005 Survey, by correctly describing a slowdown in cogen growth around 2003, is somehow inconsistent with RMI's data. Quite the contrary: our analysis clearly reflects that slowdown, as well as the very rapid growth we documented in and after 2005 in distributed renewables (see Fig. 8, p. 35, in "The Nuclear Illusion"). Moreover, the cogen market has since revived, adding more capacity in 2006 than in any year since 2000, the first year of the Diesel and Gas Turbine Worldwide (DGTW) survey. Mr. Bradish has somehow overlooked this finding of WADE's 2006 survey, which he cited above for other purposes (a practice he calls "cherry-picking the data" when he wrongly accuses us of doing it).
Our database accurately shows the year-by-year fluctuations in each technology: for example, nuclear net capacity additions in 2003 were the lowest of any year from 2000 to 2006. WADE's 2006 survey notes (p. 36) that thanks to recent growth, distributed generation's share (using its narrower definition) of total world power generation nearly doubled in four years, from ~13.0 percent in 2002 to ~24.5 percent in 2005. Nuclear power's share remains stuck at about 2 percent.
"Is Coal Included in the 'Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation' Data?"
Yes, but not much. Our "Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation" data are based on 2004 data in the WADE 2005 Survey. Capacity in subsequent years is calculated by adding the new installations reported in DGTW. Although coal is not included in those yearly additions reported by DGTW, the 2004 fuel mix is unknown. It does include some coal, chiefly in China and India (where gas is often unavailable), and to some extent in Germany, all aided by coal subsidies. The U.S. Energy Information Administration's partial cogen database also reports that in 2006, 18.7 percent of the electricity produced by the U.S. industrial and commercial sectors from fossil fuels, or 13.7 percent from all sources, was coal-fired, some of which was culm or waste coal (Annual Energy Review 2006, p. 229). However, even coal-fired cogen greatly reduces the carbon otherwise emitted by separate production of power and heat, because it displaces the separate fueled boiler(s) otherwise needed to produce the heat that cogen recovers. The resulting carbon saving is smaller than for the predominant gas-fired cogen, let alone for renewables, but is still substantial.
Summary: ... RMI's analysis erroneously uses twice the actual capacity factor for 'non-biomass decentralized co-generation. Second, RMI's analysis distorts the actual contribution from nuclear's 'true competitors' with the use of chartjunk. Third, RMI's analysis makes selective use of data in order to state that nuclear's 'true competitors' are turning 'in a stunning global market performance' when in fact one [of] their own sources actually says the opposite. Finally, RMI's analysis misleads the reader by not stating that coal is included in this graph, when actually it is.
Our responses above show point-by-point that:
- Our 83 percent cogeneration capacity factor is correct, plausible, and possibly conservative.
- Our graphs correctly show the total effect of nuclear's non-central-plant competitors; Mr. Bradish prefers to omit the embarrassing total.
- Mr. Bradish shows no defect or selectivity in our data about competitors' market performance, says nothing about the renewable competitors whose performance was the most "stunning" (as we called it), and selectively mischaracterizes what our primary data source said about cogeneration. When, as occurred in 2006, nuclear adds 30-40x less capacity than micropower, a tenth as much as wind, and less than even photovoltaics, that is indeed stunning.
- We correctly described onsite generators not fueled by biomass or other renewables; Mr. Bradish criticizes us for not itemizing their fuel portfolio, even though fuel-mix data range from sketchy (roughly half gas on the margin) to nonexistent, and readers may be safely presumed to know what fossil fuels comprise.
RMI's analysis is not perfect, but we have made a conscientious, transparent, and well-documented effort to assemble the best data available. Suggestions for improving our analysis will be gratefully received at isheikh [at] rmi.org.
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Comments
View as Flat
Sean Casten Posted 2:49 am
19 Jun 2008
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Gar Lipow Posted 2:50 am
19 Jun 2008
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Sean Casten Posted 3:31 am
19 Jun 2008
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David Bradish Posted 5:51 am
19 Jun 2008
Thanks for responding to my original post. I have a couple of questions and comments to your response.
You said: Finally, where possible, we compared calculated output to estimated output from other sources to verify that our calculations were realistic.
I never read any comparisons in any of your documents. Did you do this internally? Did I miss it? What other sources verified that your "calculations were realistic"?
WADE's economic analysis of cogen on p. 5 of the cited World Survey of Decentralized Energy 2005 uses 7,500 h/y, equivalent to 85.6%.
And it also uses 5,000 hours and 8,100 hours. The table you cited are only assumptions to show the "impact of gas price changes." This isn't "empirical" data.
Average capacity factor of all decentralized plant types cannot be validly applied to cogeneration or any other type in the mix:
Yes it can for this situation. You calculated in your excel file that "decentralized non-biomass cogen" makes up 266.3 GW out of WADE's 281.9 GW in 2004. This means that 94 percent of decentralized capacity is cogeneration. If the surveyed countries reported a total capacity factor of 40.1 percent from decentralized capacity, then the decentralized cogen's capacity factor is somewhere around 40 percent. It's as simple as that.
His claims that "it is impossible" for cogen to have an 83% capacity factor, since it makes up "the majority of the decentralized capacity," overlooks that our micropower data include many types of renewables that WADE excludes.
I never said "micropower." I said "non-biomass decentralized co-generation plants" and as I said above, the 40 percent capacity factor for that category is accurate because it DOES make up the majority of the decentralized capacity.
Our methodology derives our stated average capacity factor from the empirical capacity factors for each source.
Quoting Michael Brown does not mean it's "empirical" data.
Small sample of countries may not represent the whole:
What do you mean "small sample"? Your methodology on page 5 and WADE's 2005 survey on page 32 states that "world decentralized energy totaled 282.3 GWe at the end of 2004." Yet when you add up the "small sample of countries" in the WADE survey, it comes out to 341.6 GW. Now that doesn't make sense.
"There is [no] ... methodology" for RMI's projections of micropower growth during 2008-2010.
This is the second time you've mis-quoted my words. Here's what I said in my post: "According to the RMI paper, the "non-biomass decentralized co-generation" projection is a "target" based on personal communications with WADE. There is no model, study, or methodology mentioned to support the projection." Where is "micropower" mentioned here?
Nuclear power's share remains stuck at about 2%.
Try 15 percent in 2005.
"Is Coal Included in the 'Non-Biomass Decentralized Co-Generation' Data?" Yes, but not much.
Um, your response still didn't say how much. In fact the DGTW source you brought up said "the 2004 fuel mix is unknown."
Here's what the 2005 WADE survey says on page ii for those who haven't seen it: "Global installed DE capacity stood at around 281.9 GWe at the end of 2004, the great proportion of this consisting of high efficiency cogeneration systems in the industrial and district heating sectors, fuelled by coal and gas and, to a lesser extent, biomass-based fuels."
This is enough from me for this comment. I have three other posts for you to check out and respond to if you would like.
Amory Lovins and His Nuclear Illusion - Part Two (Big Plants vs. Small Plants)
Amory Lovins and His Nuclear Illusion - Part Three (Energy Efficiency and "Negawatts")
Amory Lovins and His Nuclear Illusion - Part Four (New Nuclear Plants Costs)
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christophersj Posted 5:55 am
19 Jun 2008
http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E08-01_AmbioNuclIlu ...
-Christopher S. Johnson
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David Roberts Posted 6:28 am
19 Jun 2008
grist.org
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Max8806 Posted 6:51 am
19 Jun 2008
Just weighing in on this argument over to what extent those numbers unfairly attribute too much of the progress on micropower/DE to coal/gas -
if it's number 1) above, then it is in fact lumping a plant which becomes less dirty (per energy produced), but still significantly dirty, with entirely clean renewables. And so I think that would be misleading on behalf of RMI. If its 2) above, then the fuel is really just waste heat, and it shouldn't matter if the waste heat originally came from the combustion of coal or dandelions, its power without extra pollution, and so the number is legit to call clean/micropower/RE.
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greentiger Posted 7:40 am
19 Jun 2008
-That said, it appears that much of the high capital costs for new plants are attributed to an inverse economies of scale as new plant construction has slowed dramatically in recent decades... isn't it therefore somewhat unfair to state that as a mature technology it is not prone to much cost reductions? I understand there most likely won't be a quantum leap as is the potential in, say, solar, but the revitalization of the industry (which would probably require essentially some kind of executive enforcement/encouragement) should bring capital costs further down.
-In looking at just the US's electricity portfolio, a few things jump out at me. Let's look at where we are now with ~20% nuclear, 50% coal, and the rest a medley of NG, hydro, renewables, etc. So soon that 20% nuclear will go offline, as many plants are past their expiration date and others will be so shortly. Let's say we swap in 20% wind (a reasonable ceiling for grid penetration, and even generous as we'll consider reducing that whole pie altogether via efficiency).
That leaves us with our original electricity pie, with a negligible CO2 emission reduction. Then we factor in efficiency. This is the most nebulous to me. Basically I'm skeptical that reducing more than 20% of our current demand will be pretty difficult, and after that will only just keep up with natural energy demand growth (as brought about pop. growth and a more 'electrified' society--i.e. energy demand will plateau at a 20% reduction from current levels).
So let's say we just removed that 20% from the 50% coal pie; awesome. But then let's consider that we want an electrified transportation nation (plug in hybrids, electric light rail, etc.). I think transport is about 1/3 of total energy usage--or about half as much as electricity production. I think we can certainly improve efficiency here by a factor of 2, i'll even say 3 (with the combo of less driving, more pub transit, and more efficient vehicles). But we need to add (0.33 * 0.50 * 100 = 16%) back to our 'electricity pie' that we reduced to 80%; so we're back to 96%.
-I've neglected solar. I work in solar! I love it! I don't see why 10% will be too difficult; I'll hedge my bets at 10% due to my ignorance of what the combined effect of wind and solar intermittentcy (now we have a combined 30/96 wind/solar fraction) is.
-That leaves us at 86% of our current electricity pie. I've left out cogen so far. The two universities I've attended both have cogen plants. I like it a lot. But I remain kinda skeptical of how popular it'll ever be in the US. Simply put, while people might like the idea putting PV panels on their roofs, I'm not sure how they feel about the neighborhood NG plant a mile away, in addition to all the upheaval caused by installation of steam lines, etc. Furthermore, many geographic places don't need the excess heating. So I'm not gonna factor in much for cogen. Maybe a few percent--i'll say 4.
-So after all that we have 82% of our current electricity demand; but this necessitates that 32/82 is still from coal power; we've reduced our coal usage by 2*(50-32)% = 36%. Not bad, but not stellar. In other words, to get rid of the rest we could use nuclear. Given my rather thrown-together (but I think pretty reasonable; i think i erred more on the side of enviro-friendly advances) analysis, the next choice to get rid of those coal plants is nuclear (we've saturated wind, solar, etc. (sorry i neglected the always-left out geothermal)).
And so, I'm left to the conclusion that abandoning nuclear doesn't seem like such a good thing, given it could eliminate coal power altogether (with a less-than doubling of it's current energy production in the US). If someone actually manages to read this, could they be so kind as to where they see my calculations as being far off the mark as to what we can easily achieve?
Thanks
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Max8806 Posted 8:51 am
19 Jun 2008
And just since you asked about potential advances in nuclear, South Africa is working on a PBMR design (Pebble Bed Modular Reactor). They key word being Modular - letting them deploy smaller ones (I think around 165MW, which would still be the equivalent of an over 400MW wind farm when you consider capacity factor) and so require less of the major upfront capital. Also you could start getting revenue from the first few in sequence as you built the rest, to start paying off the capital loans still incurred faster. And it would use a Helium coolant - inert so it wouldn't turn radioactive, which means safer if it leaks but also less maintenance on the pipes its traveling through (less decay). And it wouldn't be thirsty for water, which will grow ever scarcer. So yea there are technological advancements ahead for nuclear.
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greentiger Posted 9:46 am
19 Jun 2008
Is this the first commercial scale PBR? (It is to my knowledge)
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Nucbuddy Posted 10:03 am
19 Jun 2008
How could that be done? Even Denmark was unable to achieve that. At the current price of $64,000/KW, 100 GW of wind would cost $6.4 trillion.
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Nucbuddy Posted 10:06 am
19 Jun 2008
Each pebble is its own containment, and thus would need separate certification.
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GRLCowan Posted 11:15 am
19 Jun 2008
The only way nuclear energy could conceivably have been a political winner in the last three decades of the first millennium would have been to be nonthreatening to government oil and gas revenue, i.e., to be green.
--- G.R.L. Cowan, H2 energy fan 'til ~1996
http://www.eagle.ca/~gcowan/boron_blast.html
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Karen Street Posted 11:41 am
19 Jun 2008
Please explain.
Karen Street
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Nucbuddy Posted 12:22 pm
19 Jun 2008
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Charles Barton Posted 12:48 pm
19 Jun 2008
Charles Barton
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nirsnet Posted 4:52 am
20 Jun 2008
Getting to essentially a 100% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 is not only necessary, it's possible--and it can be done while closing all nuclear reactors and building no new ones. In fact, it can only be done without building new ones, since wasting huge amounts of money on new reactors would divert the resources needed to achieve a carbon-free energy future.
And for more info on nuclear power issues, studies on nukes/climate, etc., go to http://www.nirs.org.
Michael Mariotte
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
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Nucbuddy Posted 6:23 am
20 Jun 2008
Why has Denmark not achieved this?
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Lisa Stiles Posted 7:10 am
20 Jun 2008
Luckily, David Bradish has debunked some of their reports too at the Nuclear Notes blog.
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advancednano Posted 5:10 am
23 Jun 2008
the current nuclear plants will not be going offline soon. They are getting 20 year operating extensions to 60 years of operation. Over half have been extended already and the next half have not yet needed to apply for extensions. There is no reason to expect that most will not be granted the extensions. Other nuclear plants around the world are also getting operating extensions.
Japan is extending there nuclear plants to 70 years of operation. The USA is researching extensions to 80 years of operation.
==General criticsm of the Lovins article
36 nuclear reactors are under construction now.
93 more are in advanced project preparation and should be started and completed by 2016.
15 reactors in the USA have had initiated license applications.
Another 12 are expected by the end of 2008.
Watts Bar Unit 2 in not included in those figures, which had a construction restart. It should be operating in 2013.
Power uprates will be increasing nuclear power in the USA by an average of 400 MWe each year. France is also uprating all of its nuclear reactors.
Nuclear is not a declining industry, since power supplied from nuclear has been increasing many times since the 1970's when Lovins first said the nuclear industry was "dieing". Nuclear power supplied is still increasing.
=====
ExternE calculates deaths from natural gas at about 4 deaths per TWh.
So 2000 Twh would be 8000 deaths per year.
http://nextbigfuture.com/2008/03/deaths-per-twh-for-all-e ...
Biomass deaths are higher per TWh.
====
Costs have gone up for Wind, hydro, natural gas and all the renewable projects as well. Steel and concrete and other costs have gone up. Nuclear is not alone in cost increases.
There are supply chain and labor supply issues for the renewable side as well. (Natural gas even for smaller projects is not renewable power if the gas is coming from mined sources). Wind turbine supply issues. Building up new solar supply chain.
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Max8806 Posted 7:00 am
23 Jun 2008
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advancednano Posted 3:04 pm
23 Jun 2008
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html
Under construction
7 in China
7 in Russia
6 in India
3 in South Korea
2 in Japan
2 in Slovakia
2 in Canada
1 in Finland
1 in France
1 in Iran
1 in Pakistan
1 in Argentia
Plant
Lingao-2 (units 3 & 4)
2x1080
Started: 12/05, 5/06
Expected operation: 10/10, 2011
Qinshan 4(units 6 & 7)
2x650
Started: 4/06, 1/07
expected operation: 2011, 2012
Hongyanhe 1 (units 1-4)
4x1080
Start: 8/07, 4/08, 3/09, 7/10
Expected operation:10/12, 2014
Yangjiang 1(units 1-2)
2x1080
Will start: 9/08, 2/09
Expected: 5/13, 2015
Ningde 1 (units 1-2)
2x1080
Start: 2/08, 9/08,
Expected operation: 12/12-2013
Sanmen 1 (units 1 & 2)
2x1100
Will Start: 3/2009
Operation: 8/13, 2014
Haiyang (units 1 & 2)
2x1100
AP1000
Will Start: 9/2009
Expected operation: 2014-15
Taishan 1 Guangdong
2x1700
Will start: 8/09, 1/10
Expected operation: 11/13, 2015
Shidaowan Shandong
200
HTR-PM China Huaneng
early 2009
2013
Fangjiashan (Qinshan 5)
2x1000/1080
Will Start: 6/2009
Expected operation: 2013 & 14
total 21 22,260 MWe
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63.html
Another 14 in the 11th economic plan starting operation in 2013-2016.
Yangjiang 2 (Units 3&4)
Ningde 2 (units 3 & 4)
Honshiding Rushan 1
Fuqing 1
Bailong 1
Russian list
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.html
Rostov /Volgodonsk 2 being built: operation 2009
Kursk 5 2010 or 2011 operation
Severodvinsk (2) 2010 operation
Kalinin 4 2011 operation
Beloyarsk 4 2012 operation
Novovoronezh II -1 2012 operation
India's six are coming online 2008-2010
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html
South Korea's three
Shin Kori 1 started June 2006
expected operation12/2010
Shin Kori 2 started June 2007
expected operation 12/2011
Shin Wolsong 1 started Nov 2007
expected 3/2012
Japan
Tomari-3 started : 2003
expected operation : 2009
Shimane 3 started December 2005
expected operation: 12/2011
The US plants are being licensed, we will see how long those take to get built, but I do not see delays for China, India, Russia, S Korea,or Japan where most of the 96 plants will get built.
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anyone Posted 2:41 am
27 Sep 2008
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1554 ...
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=8916 ...
After 60 years of massive public funding, it's time for nuclear to learn to walk on its own feet.
Also, why does the nuclear industry still need tax payers to pay for institutions like IAEA or Euratom to promote nuclear energy? Can't the nuclear industry start to use their own funds instead of constantly asking us taxpayers for help?
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