Lieberman-Warner is deeply flawed. And like most things political, it's most passionate defenders and opponents are insufferable.
It is sad but true that there is no such thing as perfect legislation, for the simple reason that the democratic process demands compromise. Therefore, to the extent that Lieberman-Warner is only imperfect to the degree that is demanded by our political process (e.g., if it's the best we can do, all considering), so be it.
It's not that good. And lest there be any confusion, I come to bury, not to praise. But that doesn't mean that we ought not have a more responsible discussion of the details of Lieberman-Warner and how they can be better framed. Because like it or not, this is the train upon which our national greenhouse gas policy will be framed. It may or may not leave the station prior to 2009 (I for one think it won't), but it's going to be the framework from which any future bill starts. And rather than expend our effort trying to derail that train, this is the time to be reviewing the cars. Keep the good ones, replace the bad ones (probably overhauling the engine in the process), but don't delude ourselves into thinking that we can throw the whole thing out, start fresh, and end up with perfection.
Here, then, is my attempt to try to dive into those details so that we can have a more enlightened debate.
As seems to be my way lately, this is going to take a couple posts. A few themes in the meantime:
The need for compromise isn't as strong as you think
Our entire global conversation about GHG mitigation -- going all the way back to Rio -- starts from the flawed assumption that reducing GHG concentrations is incompatible with economic growth. This simply isn't true, especially in the U.S., where 67 percent of all our GHG emissions come from sources who have a disincentive to invest in energy efficiency. On the thermal side (all those industrial and residential boilers), we have environmental regulations that inadvertently mandate higher CO2 emissions. And on the electric side, we have 100 years of regulation that explicitly discourages electric utilities from investments in energy efficiency. The result is that we have a massive opportunity to lower GHG emissions and lower our cost of energy. And yet we frame the debate not as an economic growth policy, but as a fight over which stakeholder should lose. This is not productive, as evidenced by the fact that 16 years after the Rio summit, we're still arguing about losers instead of investing in our economic growth. And we will continue to do so for as long as we keep asking the wrong questions.
The result is that every climate policy -- starting with Kyoto, through RGGI, and now in Lieberman-Warner -- starts with the idea that someone has to lose, and therefore starts from a position of compromise. We do not need to take this approach. For example, if we assume that electric utilities will have to pay to lower their carbon, then we have a fight about losers. On the other hand, if we reframe that conversation as one that says "let's let utilities keep some of the upside when they invest in efficiency," we get the same outcome without the compromise. That is what we ought to demand, rather than simply accepting compromise as the inevitable cost of good -- but imperfect -- legislation.
Lieberman-Warner details
With that as background, here is a high-level summary of the problems with the L-W details. Remember, the problem is with the rail cars, not the train.
- It includes small sticks, but no carrots. Lowering our GHG emissions will require massive capital investment, meaning that GHG policy better provide incentives for the private sector to start deploying capital as fast as possible. Lieberman-Warner confuses political pork with carrots. This rail car can be replaced. (Good news for all you vegetarians who prefer carrots anyway!)
- It conflates GHG policy with social policy. This is unfortunately true for almost all GHG policy discussions, which see a massive amount of money coming from polluters and begin to salivate over who we ought to nominate as recipients of that largesse. Those of a moral bent pick social programs (à la "cap and dividend"). Those of a greedier bent simply stick out their hands. But the net result of both approaches is one in which polluters pay and government-mandated winners get paid. This may or may not be good social policy, but it certainly isn't a good GHG policy, for the simple reason that it directs money away from GHG reduction and towards something else. It is analogous to the public school that spends money on free lunches, busing, handicapped access, and all sorts of other (admittedly really noble) things and then finds that they don't have enough resources left to provide the same level of education as the neighboring private school. L-W needs to be narrowed down to a GHG policy.
- It puts the incentives in the wrong place. Suppose you were trying to build a basketball team, and you rounded up everyone in your neighborhood. You then single out the shortest, least agile kids and yell at them until they can dunk and reverse in the lane. Keep at it long enough, and you'll have ... a bunch of pissed-off short kids. That, in essence, is what Lieberman-Warner does. It imposes penalties (sticks) on entities who have very few options to lower their GHG signature and then provides no reward for those who do. Like our basketball team, it will absolutely piss people off ... but it's not at all clear whether it will lower GHG emissions.
- It gets really important details wrong. From additionality to decoupling, it's just sloppy.
All of these flaws are fixable. More detail on each of the four points above to follow.
Comments
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Miles Grant Posted 4:03 am
24 Apr 2008
I know you don't want to compromise from a scientific perspective, but at a time when our emissions continue rising out of control, wouldn't you rather make a political compromise to get us on the path of cutting emissions now?
http://www.nwf.org
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Sean Casten Posted 4:22 am
24 Apr 2008
My point is that the underlying presumption (that GHG mitigation is economically painful) is flawed. Massive GHG reductions are possible that will generate profits - even more if we get rid of existing rules that subsidize the dirtiest sources. Ergo, rather than figuring out how to spread economic pain, our conversation ought to start from the perspective of maximizing economic development opportunities.
Is there still need for compromise in a democratic process? Of course. But it's not nearly as big as L-W presumes. And worse, L-W is set up in a way that preferentially directs resources towards the most economically painful GHG-mitigation approache, essentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy if enacted as currently structured. I'll be providing more detail on this in subsequent posts.
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ce1907 Posted 12:20 pm
24 Apr 2008
suggest legislative language for the fixes
contact NRDC or other big enviro group, ask them to pitch it
you have about a week to get done
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hapa Posted 8:10 pm
24 Apr 2008
hansen says 350's the target and we can solidly expect to capture 50 with plants, making 400 the safe peak
wall street's itching for a new bubble to save itself from jumping out the window and L-W provides a frictionless market for hucksterism
and you display a tin ear for whole policy, questioning the necessity of ensuring school access as part of guaranteeing education
i can feel my chances of survival slipping away.
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ce1907 Posted 10:31 pm
24 Apr 2008
I am saying join the process
talk when it will help most to the people writing an amended bill
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hapa Posted 11:32 pm
24 Apr 2008
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Sean Casten Posted 1:38 am
25 Apr 2008
Per my post though, I don't see this as having only a week to get changes done. Even if this passes the Senate, it's highly unlikely to get through the House and dodge a Presidential veto this year. The reason for this series of posts is to outline what is good and bad about L-W so that - once we get into a political environment that is more conducive to passage of GHG legislation through both houses - we've got the details right. As currently formulated, the L-W details are pretty crummy.
Hapa: to be clear, the problem with L-W is not that it seeks to lower GHG emissions. It is that it seeks to do so through a really complicated piece of legislation that is ultimately deeply flawed, from both an environmental and economic perspective. (e.g., with simplification, the bill could not only lower GHG emissions faster, but at lower net societal cost.)
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hapa Posted 5:41 am
25 Apr 2008
did you notice that 33 and 50, they aren't zero? we're talking old plants... not compatible with CCS, right? but while there's a carbon market your facilities would be pretty profitable, right?
i like heat capture and the short term improvement is awesome.
but do you have a financial interest in not having the stabilization target be below current? we'd still have to phase out your plants, unless you intend to fight for continuing pollution.
if that's true, why are you writing here?
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greenfire8 Posted 6:26 am
29 Apr 2008
We could apply your political hypothesis to Kyoto. Why havent we been a part of replacing/rearranging those cars? Actually, we have. Despite the fact we pulled out of the treaty, we do still affect its language. We have derailed talks numerous times and pushed for more "flexible" mechanisms like CDM that the financial intermediaries have been drooling over....an enormous loophole for additionality, prospecting, and ultimately, creating counterfeit reduction certificates.
I'm going w/ Miles and ce1907. For the sake of political expediency and reductions today as opposed to years from now, I like Audubon, Center for International Law, Clean Water Action, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice, Environment America, Environmental Defense, League of Conservation Voters, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Ocean Conservancy, Pew Environment Group, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, The Wilderness Society, and World Wildlife Fund's stance.
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2008/080312.asp
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